Abstract: How important is the internalization of values by citizens to the effectiveness of the state? Civic acts by citizens help the state to overcome potentially crippling agency problems. Law influences the behavior of citizens through expression, deterrence, and internalization. Distinguishing these effects shows the importance of each, and also shows why the state can express and deter more easily than it can induce citizens to internalize values. In a rational, self-interested theory of the internalization of values, people change their preferences to increase their opportunities for cooperation with others. Since officials have remote relationships with citizens in modern states, the state lacks the information needed to reward virtuous citizens. Instead of promoting civic virtue directly, the state must rely on families, friends, and colleagues to encourage civic virtue. To achieve this goal, the state must first align law with the social norms that facilitate private cooperation.
In contrast, moral believers hold that an effective state requires its citizens to internalize particular values. In this view, morality must temper self-interest in many citizens to make them governable.
In the past, the balance of opinion clearly favored believers and disfavored skeptics. According to James Gordley, few pre-moderns questioned the belief that the health of the state reflects the virtue of its citizens. 8 Behind this scholarly tradition stands common sense opinion, which Gerald Lynch recently articulated:
"What society wants from its members, in any case, is not intelligent calculation of the costs and benefits of abiding by its basic norms, but more or less unthinking obedience to them. To the extent that people are specifically comparing the costs and benefits to them of breaking criminal laws, the battle is already lost; many of them must conclude, in particular situations, that the calculus favors law-breaking...For society to function, most people 5 (Almond and Verba; Barry); (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti Vol. 1, no. 3 (July 1988); . 6 (Knack and Keefer 1997) ; get other cites including Becker. 7 For a recent introduction, see the symposia on social norms in (Symposium on Social Norms and the Law 1996) and also cite symposium on social norms in JLS 1998**. 8 Private communication between Professor Gordley and me. **Insert cite. He offers Machiavelli as a possible exception.
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have to obey the law for reasons of conscience and conviction, and not out of fear of punishment."
9
Against the weight of traditional scholarship and common sense stands the economic analysis of law. Some economists proclaim moral skepticism and almost all economists practice it in their research. Economic models based on rationally self-interested actors implicitly assume moral skepticism. The great success of these models proves the fruitfulness of skepticism about human motivation in analyzing law and government.
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Purely self-interested models, however, apparently fail to explain significant activities of people. To illustrate, the people in laboratory games conducted by economists and social psychologists persistently cooperate more than predicted by rational self-interest. 11 For example, people share payoffs with others when doing so has no reward. A crucial failure of self-interested theories of politics concerns voting in elections. Journalists chide citizens for low rates of participation in elections, whereas economists find participation rates inexplicably high. According to one calculation, the probability of casting a decisive vote in a typical U.S. general election approximately equals 10 -8
. 12 Under any reasonable assumptions, the probability that a particular voter will be decisive in a general election is so small that purely self-interested citizens would not bother to vote at current rates. As with voting, self-interested motives probably cannot explain the decisions of independent judges.
To encompass these facts, economics can postulate a "taste" for fairness, voting, or judging. Or perhaps economists can postulate a general taste for selfexpression that encompasses particular tastes for fairness, voting, and judging.
To explain an unexplained behavior by reference to an unexplained taste, 9 (Lynch 1997) . 10 (Landes 1993) 11 (Bazerman and Neale 1995; Burrows 1990 ; presented at EALE annual meeting, Rome, 1990; Cook; Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Rabin 1993; Sugden 1984; . 12 See discussion in (Hasen 1996) . Using a different method of calculation, (Romer 1996) concludes at page 200 that the probability of a tie in a U.S. presidential election in which 50 million people vote is approximately 10 -4
. For a comparison of self-interested and civic-minded theories of voter participation, see Chapter 2 of ( 2000) . A more careful strategic theory of voting developed by Pessendorfer** provides a clever but ultimately unconvincing solution to this puzzle. See Pessendorfer **. however, is rather like asserting that opium makes people drowsy because of its Before constructing a new building in Rome, the builder must sift through the detritus from centuries of human occupation and activity. Similarly, old debates can easily retard building a new theory of internalization. I will try to avoid engaging in old debates as much as possible. One old debate that I will completely avoid is whether or not citizens who internalize civic morality are ultimately self-interested. I leave to philosophers, especial Kantians, the question, "What is the difference between an unselfish desire to treat others fairly and a selfish desire to satisfy a taste for treating others fairly?" Instead of joining the philosophers in debating whether altruistic desires are really selfish, social
13 (Stigler and Becker 1977) . 14 (Frank 1987; Benson 1998; Bowles 1998; Hechter 1994; McManus 1978; Peleg and Yaari 1973; ; Stigler and Becker 1977; Sugden 1990; Yaari 1977; von Weizsacker 1971; Dixit and Norman 1980; Dixit and Norman 1979; Dixit and Norman 1978; Hammond 1976; Elster 1997; Pollak 1976 Figure 1 represents the amount a person would be willing to pay to do a particular civic act, and the horizontal axis represents the proportion of citizens willing to pay the price. According to the graph, a small number of people are willing to pay a lot and a large number of people are willing to pay a little. Roughly 80% of the citizens will pay something 15 (Cooter 1998b; Cooter 1998a) . 16 There is, I believe, a difference detectable by behavioral theories between a person who thinks of himself as acting fairly for selfish reasons and a person who thinks of himself as acting fairly for intrinsic reasons. The difference concerns the conditions under which the person's motives will change. To illustrate, arguments appealing to selfishness are more likely to change the behavior of an egoist than a moralists. This fact, in turn, may affect the stability of the behavior in question. The effect of argument on stability, however, is not the usual focus of behavioral theories. 17 (Cooter 1998b; Cooter 1997a) .
to do their civic duty, whereas roughly 20% will pay nothing. Thus I say that roughly 80% of the population has internalized their civic duty (although not to the same extent), and roughly 20% of the population externalizes their civic duty.
To illustrate concretely, imagine a state in which 80% of the citizens are willing to expend some time and effort in order to vote, but not everyone is willing to expend the same amount, and 20% of the citizens are unwilling to expend anything. Another distinction concerns the difference between derived demand and final demand. The demand for seed corn, chromium, and sulfuric acid by producers derives from the demand by consumers for the goods produced by using seed corn, chromium, and sulfuric acid. In contrast, households demand food, automobiles, and newspapers for final consumption. The preferences of consumers determine final demand, whereas final demand ultimately determines derived demand. Similarly, the curve in Figure 1 represents the intrinsic value of civic acts to the actor, which depends on the preferences of citizens. In contrast, civic acts can have instrumental value for people without any preference to do their civic duty. To illustrate, the instrumental value of civic acts often depends on the advantage gained from having the reputation of being a good citizen.
Having graphed the price that citizens are willing to pay to do their civic duty, now I turn to the cost that they have to pay. 
Cost of Acting
The curves for expected cost and wiliness-to-pay can assume various shapes, depending on historical details and institutional accidents. I want to combine the two curves in a single figure. To reduce the number of graphs, I
have drawn shapes for the curves in Figure 3 that captures the most interesting possibilities. Where the two curves intersect, the cost of doing the civic act equals the price people are willing to pay, so the system is in equilibrium. To illustrate, an equilibrium occurs in Figure 3 at roughly 20% and 50%. (Later I explain that a "corner" equilibrium also occurs at 0%.) Where the willingness-to-pay curve is above the expected cost curve, more people are willing to do the act than required to sustain the current cost of doing it, so the proportion of people doing the act is increasing. To illustrate, in the interval between 20% and 50%, the proportion of people acting increases as indicated by the arrow in Figure 3 . Conversely, where the cost curve is above the willingness-to-pay curve, fewer people are willing to do the act than required to sustain the current cost of doing it, so the proportion of people doing the act is decreasing. To illustrate, in the interval between 50% and 100%, the proportion of people acting decreases as indicated by the arrow. Similarly, in the interval between 0% and 20%, the proportion of people acting decreases as indicated by the arrow.
As indicated by the arrows in Figure 3 , starting from any point below 20%, the system tends to move to 0%, and starting from any point above 20%, the system tends to move to 50%. Thus 0% and 50% are the stable equilibria of the system depicted in Figure 3 . I will use these facts to analysis to distinguish three ways that law influences behavior: expression, deterrence, and internalization.
Expression As Cheap Talk
What determines whether the system depicted in Figure 3 settles into an equilibrium at 0% or 50%? If everyone believes that less than 20% of the citizens will do the act in question, then their belief will prove correct and the system will converge to the equilibrium at 0%. Conversely, if everyone believes that more than 20% of the citizens will do the act in question, then their belief will prove correct and the system will converge to the equilibrium at 50%. So the system has characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Given this fact, the law might play a crucial role in determining the outcome by influencing peoples' beliefs about what others will do. To illustrate, recall that the act represented in the figures is doing a civic duty. The state presumably wants citizens to do their civic duty. If the state is careful about its pronouncements, so that most citizens believe them, then the state might cause the system to converge to the equilibrium at 50% merely by making the appropriate pronouncement.
In general, a credible state can influence the choice of multiple equilibria among citizens by pronouncing the law. Legal expression, consequently, can cause large changes in behavior, such as the jump from 0% to 50% in Figure 3 .
Predicting large jumps in behavior, however, requires global information about the curves in Figure 3 . The need for so much information makes the expressive use of law hazardous. (Farrell and Rabin 1996; Farrell 1995; Farrell 1987) 22 (Farrell and Rabin 1996) call this condition "self-signaling". Economists have devoted much effort to designing "incentive compatible mechanisms" for the supply of public goods. 24 To my knowledge, however, no research focuses on mechanisms to induce public officials to disclose their true plans. 25 The theory of cheap talk provides the foundation for designing mechanisms to induce public officials to disclose their true plans. Such mechanisms can enable legal expression to change behavior. Now I relate the conditions of effective cheap talk to the equilibria in Figure   3 . Recall that this figure depicts the relationship between the willingness of citizens to do civic acts and their costs. Assume that society is stuck at the inferior equilibrium where 0% of the citizens do civic acts. How can politics and law move society to the superior equilibrium where 50% of the citizens do their 23 ( 1993) . 24 cite Emons and Wilson** 14 civic duty. Officials might try to provoke this change by explaining the shape of the curves to the citizens and urging them to behave differently. If a civic "pep talk" caused at least 20% of the citizens to change and do their duty, then the system will ascend to the superior equilibrium where 50% do their duty.
A good political leader has the power to change society by cheap talk. To illustrate by Figure 3 , assume the leader asks 20% of the citizens to do their civic duty and promises them that their example will cause 30% more of the citizens to follow their example. The accuracy of the leader's prediction and the goodness of the results will strengthen his influence. In general, leadership enables officials to influence behavior by cheap talk, which saves the transaction costs of expensive talk.
Rearranging the payoffs in Figure 4 Instead of focusing on deterring wrongdoing, however, this paper focuses on voluntary performance of civic duties. A reward for rightdoing corresponds to a sanction for wrongdoing. Attaching a reward for rightdoing lowers its expected cost. To depict this change graphically, Figure 5 shows a downward shift in the expected cost curve. As a consequence of this shift, the tipping point at 20%
moves down approximately to 15%. Thus the system will converge to 0% from any point below 15%. Similarly, the stable equilibrium at 50% moves up approximately to 65%. Thus the system will converge to 65% from any point above 15%.
Consider the consequences of this change. If the system is initially at the equilibrium at 50%, the shift in the cost curve causes the system to move to 65%. This is a small change. Alternatively, if the system is initially at the equilibrium at 0%, then the system requires a shock of 15% to trigger convergence to the equilibrium at 50%. This is a large jump in behavior. Thus deterrence of wrongdoing or reward of rightdoing has one of two possible effects on the targeted behavior: either a small change for certain or a higher probability of a large jump. When economics to deterrence, small changes are the usual subject of the analysis, whereas jumps in behavior are more difficult to predict and identify.
28 ( 1980) reviews this tradition.
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Figure 5: Reward 0% 25% 50% 65% 100%
Proportion of People A cting w illingn ess-to-pa y exp ected cost $ Earlier I discussed the fact that predicting jumps in behavior requires global information about the curves in Figure 3 . Conversely, predicting small changes in behavior caused by deterrence requires local information about the curves in Figure 3 . In general, the marginal effect of deterrence is easier to predict than jumps in behavior. As a consequence of this fact, lawmakers are especially prone to mistakes when attempting to use rewards and punishment to trigger large jumps in behavior.
Internalization
Now I turn to the third way that law influences behavior. To begin, assume that law causes internalization and consider its effects. Whereas deterrence shifts the cost curve, internalization shifts the willingness-to-pay curve. To depict this change graphically, Figure 6 shows an upward shift in willingness to pay to do the civic act. As a consequence of this shift, the tipping point at 20% moves down approximately to 15%. Thus the system will converge to 0% from any point below 15%. Similarly, the stable equilibrium at 50% moves up approximately to 65%. Thus the system will converge to 65% from any point above 15%. causes the system to move to 65%, which is a small change. Alternatively, if the system is initially at the equilibrium at 0%, then the system requires a shock of 15% to trigger a large jump in behavior that converges to the equilibrium at 50%.
As with deterrence, internalization of values has one of two possible effects on the targeted behavior: either a small change for certain or a higher probability of a large jump.
I constructed Figure 5 and Figure 6 so that internalization and deterrence cause the same numerical change in the equilibria. I made the numbers the same to emphasize that shifting the willingness-to-pay curve corresponds formally to shifting the expected cost curve. Values and costs act in the same way to determine jointly the aggregate level of activity. From this perspective, the moral skeptic makes the same mistake as the Marxist who advocates the labor theory of value. 29 The mistake in both cases is asserting that the cost curve alone determines the level of an activity. 30 In reality, internalized values matter to civic acts and market prices.
To illustrate this mistake, consider that Holmes urged legal scholars to reason from the viewpoint of a "bad man" without respect for the law or commitment to obeying it. In so far as the bad man obeys the law, he does so for instrumental reasons. For the bad man, law is a constraint and not a guide.
Thus the bad man treats law as "external" in the sense of being outside of his own values. Economic models of law typically accept the "bad man" approach and add an additional element to it: rationality. A bad man who is rational decides whether or not to obey the law by calculating his own benefits and costs, including the risk of punishment. The rational bad man breaks the law whenever the gain to him exceeds the risk of punishment. Law and economics scholars typically make the rational bad man into the decision maker in their models, who treats the sanctions from breaking the law as a cost. The bad man does not have a "taste" for obeying the law.
In reality, society includes bad people and good citizens, as well as many citizens who are in between. Figure 6 shows how the effects of a law depend on the distribution of internalized values among citizens. Officials should not proceed by making laws only for bad people, because the response of good people also determines the effects of the laws.
Interaction Effects
Having distinguished expression, deterrence, and internalization, I will explain briefly how they interact when promulgating a law. Promulgating a law often involves proclaiming a new obligation, describing the sanction attached to its violation, and explaining the reason for enacting it. The first row of Table 1 lists these three parts of law. These three parts of a law relate especially (but not uniquely) to the three consequences of a law that I explained. Proclaiming a 29 get cite from Schaefer.
legal obligation gives people instructions on what to do, which especially promotes the coordination of behavior. Attaching a sanction to an obligation especially deters its violation. Explaining the law ideally convinces citizens to follow it. In brief, the three aspects of promulgating a law especially aim at expression, deterrence, and internalization, as indicated in the second row of Table 1 . 
Alignment or Internalization?
Internalized morality might cause citizens to support state law in two different ways. First, assume that citizens decide whether to support laws by evaluating them relative to moral standards. Under this assumption, citizens support laws that align with their morality. Consequently, effective laws must align with the morality already internalized by citizens.
To illustrate this mechanism, I will reinterpret Figure 6 . Assume that revising a law to align it more closely with morality causes the upward shift in the willingness-to-pay curve. In other words, citizens are more willing to do their civic duty because the state changes the duty in way that increases its moral appeal.
The expressive and deterrence effects of this change increase civic acts in the ways that I already explained. In general, a closer alignment of law with morality may cause a small increase in the number of citizens who do their duty or it may cause a jump in the number of citizens who do their duty.
Instead of making the indefensible claim that internalization makes no difference to civic acts, skeptics do better by asserting that internalization makes minimal difference to civic acts. My own view, which I will not defend here, is that aligning law with internalized morality can make a large difference in civic acts. view law as a guide whose instructions they strive to understand and follow.
These judges value obedience to law and search in law for values to obey.
These judges treat law as "internal" However, the unexplained residual remains large in these statistical studies, thus leaving scope for judges to act from respect for law. 31 Dworkin argues that the great judge, Hercules, will find one right answer to every legal question that is the best synthesis of existing law. In this view, the law includes values as well as rules. Hercules, however, does not draw on his how personal or political values to decide cases. (Dworkin 1977) . . Perhaps the values can be found in politically neutral legal principles. (Greenawalt; Wechsler 1959; Macey 1986 ). Later Dworkin modified his theory to allow some role for personal and political values of the judge. See (Dworkin 1986) , where Dworkin argues that the ideal of law demands principled justification for the exercise of force by the state, and the rule of law requires judges to reach decisions that not only are consistent in principle with past legal authorities, but also characterize the relevant authorities in the best moral light.
32 (Posner 1993) . Also see Chapter 10 of ( 1988) and ( 1996) .
Schauer emphasizes that the reputation of modern US judges rests increasingly on the political outcomes of their decisions, so they have the prudential incentives to law-following is all we need to explain about the concept of law. (Schauer 1998b) . Also see (Bazerman and Neale 1995; Schauer 1998a) . 33 (Cohen; Edwards 1998; Hanssen 1999; Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 1999; Salzberger and Fenn 1999; Smith and Tiller 1999; Spriggs 1997; De Figueiredo and Tiller 1995; Revesz 1999b; Revesz 1999a; Schwartz 1997; Smith and Tiller 1997; Revesz 1997) . 34 (Edwards 1998; Spriggs 1997; Revesz 1999b; Revesz 1999a; Schwartz 1997; Smith and Tiller 1997; Revesz 1997; Rasmusen 1993 ).
To illustrate how respect for law among citizens might influence their behavior, I will reinterpret Figure 6 once again. Assume that officials identify a moral obligation and raise it to the level of a legal obligation. For citizens who place no intrinsic value on obeying the law, the enactment of the law does not change their willingness to do their duty. For citizens who intrinsically value obeying the law, however, the enactment of the law increases their willingness to do their duty. The latter effect causes the willingness-to-pay curve to shift up in Figure 6 . In a society where some people respect the law as such, enacting a moral obligation into law causes a small increase in the number of citizens who do their duty or else it increases the probability of a jump in the number of citizens who do their duty. By this means, respectful citizens make lawmakers effective.
These two mechanisms for support of law by citizens--alignment of law with morality and respect for law--are interrelated. When citizens reflect upon the state, they often evaluate its performance against standards of justice. If the state performs well relative to these standards, then reflective citizens may conclude that the law deserves respect. Reflective citizens respect the law when its basic structure appears to be just. Once citizens respect the law, they obey it habitually in their daily lives without reflecting on it. Thus a just state achieves stability by generating its own support among reflective citizens.
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Now I wish to go beyond this familiar proposition in political philosophy by developing an economic analysis of how law can cause individuals to internalize values.
Causes of Internalization
Instead of making the indefensible claim that internalization makes no difference to civic acts, skeptics do better by asserting that law and public policy make minimal difference to the values internalized by citizens. to accomplish a desired change in preferences. The plethora of self-help books and psychiatrists testify to the fact that we cannot automatically change ourselves by choosing who we want to be. Instead of investigating these technical problems, I assume the existence of a technology for preference change without explaining it. In other words, I assume that people can choose to change their preferences at some cost.
The logical problems of changing preferences especially concern consistency over time. To illustrate, reconciling the fact of shifting moods and temporary emotions with the rationality requirements of consistent action over 39 get classic cites including (Samuelson 1938) . For critical appraisals, see (Russell and Thaler 1985; Sen 1997; Sen 1977; Hausman and McPherson 1994 Assume that, regardless of whether the preferences are U 0 or U 1 , the opportunities F 1 yields greater preference satisfaction than F 0 . Consequently, after making the change, the opportunities enjoyed by the decision maker are better than before relative to his new preferences and his old preferences. This fact provides a reason to make the change. A change that is better with respect to the preferences of everyone affected by it is called a "Pareto improvement".
By analogy, I call a change in preferences that leaves the decision-maker better off with respect to his original preferences and his final preferences a "Pareto self-improvement."
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Internalization and Law
I have explained that self-interested people change their preferences to increase their opportunities. Now I will relate this causal mechanism for changing preferences to the law's ability to make citizens internalize values. To induce people to internalize civic values, the state must reward citizens for 41 I analyze this concept graphically in (Cooter 1998b; Cooter 1998a The primary way to prompt people to instill civic virtue in each other is by aligning law with morality. When law aligns with morality, individuals who cultivate morality necessarily acquire civic virtue. Consequently, the law enlists the force of internalized morality to achieve the ends of the state.
Conclusion
Law influences the behavior of citizens through expression, deterrence, and internalization. How important is the internalization of values by citizens to the effectiveness of the state? Civic acts by citizens help the state to overcome potentially crippling agency problems. An increase in the willingness of citizens to do civic acts causes a small increase in the number of civic acts or else 28 increases the probability of a large jump in civic acts. So civic virtue among citizens is important to the effectiveness of modern states.
Self-interested people change their preferences to increase their opportunities. Specifically, self-interested people cultivate virtue in order to improve their opportunities for participating in cooperative activities with others.
Behavior generally reveals preferences. In the case of virtue, repeated behavior over time enables people to perceive the character of others. Character is translucent in intimate relationships and opaque in remote relationships. Since officials have remote relationships with citizens in modern states, the state lacks the information needed to reward virtuous citizens. The law must, consequently, reward and punish acts, not the actor's character. Instead of promoting civic virtue directly, the state must rely on families, friends, and colleagues to reward civic virtue. To achieve this goal, the state must first align law with the social norms that facilitate private cooperation.
